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Abstract
We introduce a symbolic characterisation of the operational semantics of COWS, a formal language for specifying and
combining service-oriented applications, while modelling their dynamic behaviour. This alternative semantics avoids infinite
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the increasing success of e-business, e-learning, e-government, and other
similar emerging models, has led the World Wide Web, initially thought of as a system for
human use, to evolve towards an architecture for service-oriented computing (SOC) sup-
porting automated use. SOC advocates the use of loosely coupled ‘services’, to be under-
stood as autonomous, platform-independent, computational entities that can be described,
published, discovered, and assembled, as the basic blocks for building interoperable and
evolvable systems and applications. While early examples of technologies that are at least
partly service-oriented date back to CORBA, DCOM, J2EE and IBM WebSphere, the most
successful instantiation of the SOC paradigm are probably the more recent web services.
These are sets of operations that can be published, located and invoked through the Web
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via XML messages complying with given standard formats. To support the web service ap-
proach, several new languages and technologies have been designed and many international
companies have invested a lot of efforts.
Current software engineering technologies for SOC, however, remain at the descriptive
level and lack rigorous formal foundations. We are still experiencing a gap between prac-
tice (programming) and theory (formal methods and analysis techniques) in the design of
SOC applications. The challenges come from the necessity of dealing at once with such
issues as asynchronous interactions, concurrent activities, workflow coordination, business
transactions, failures, resource usage, and security, in a setting where demands and guaran-
tees can be very different for the many different components. Many researchers have hence
put forward the idea of using process calculi, a cornerstone of current foundational research
on specification and analysis of concurrent, distributed and mobile systems through math-
ematical — mainly algebraic and logical — tools. Indeed, due to their algebraic nature,
process calculi convey in a distilled form the compositional programming style of SOC.
Thus, many process calculi have been designed (e.g. [8,7,15,12,9,14,3,5,26]), addressing
one aspect or another of SOC and aiming at assessing the adequacy of diverse sets of prim-
itives w.r.t. modelling, combining and analysing service-oriented applications.
By taking inspiration from well-known process calculi and from the standard language
for orchestration of web services WS-BPEL [21], in [16] we have designed COWS (Cal-
culus for Orchestration of Web Services), a process calculus for specifying and combining
service-oriented applications, while modelling their dynamic behaviour. We have shown
that COWS can model and handle distinctive features of (web) services, such as, e.g.,
correlation-based communication, compensation activities, service instances and interac-
tions among them, race conditions among service instances and service definitions.
A major benefit of using process calculi is that they enjoy a rich repertoire of elegant
meta-theories, proof techniques and analytical tools that can be likely tailored to the needs
of SOC. Concerning this, in [11] we have developed a logic and a model checker to express
and check functional properties of services specified in COWS, while in [23] we have stud-
ied observational semantic theories for COWS. However, such tools suffer from a lack of
compositionality and efficiency. Indeed, generally speaking, model and equivalence check-
ers, and other similar verification tools, do not work directly on syntactic specifications but
rather on abstract representations of the behaviour of processes. Thus, for value-passing
languages, such as COWS, using an inappropriate representation can lead to unfeasible
verifications. Indeed, according to the COWS’s original operational semantics, if the com-
municable values range over an infinite value set (e.g. natural numbers and strings), the
behaviour of a service that performs a receive activity is modelled by an infinite abstract
representation. Such representation is a Labelled Transition System whose initial state has
infinite outgoing edges, each labelled with an input label having a different value as argu-
ment and leading to a different state.
Hence, by taking inspiration from Hennessy and Lin [13], in this paper we define a sym-
bolic operational semantics for COWS. Differently from the symbolic semantics for more
standard calculi, such as value-passing CCS or π-calculus, ours deals at once with, besides
receive transitions, a number of complex features, such as, e.g., generation and exportation
of fresh names, pattern-matching, expressions evaluation, and priorities among conflicting
receives. The new semantics avoids infinite representations of COWS terms due to the
value-passing nature of communication in COWS and associates a finite representation to
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each finite COWS term. It is then more amenable for automatic manipulation by analytical
tools, such as e.g. equivalence and model checkers. Our major result is a theorem of ‘op-
erational correspondence’. We prove that, under appropriate conditions, any transition of
the original semantics can be generated using the symbolic one, and vice versa. In general,
however, additional transitions can be derived using the symbolic semantics since it also
accounts for services ability to interact with the environment.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some motivations for
the symbolic semantics of COWS; this is done by means of an ‘Italian-English translation
service’ scenario that is used also to informally describe in a step-by-step fashion the main
features of COWS. Section 3 presents the original syntax and operational semantics of
COWS. Section 4 introduces the symbolic variant of the operational semantics of COWS
and our major results, together with some clarifying examples. Section 5 shows two exten-
sions of the symbolic semantics. Finally, Section 6 touches upon comparisons with related
work and directions for future work.
2 A ‘translation service’ scenario
In this section, we present COWS main features and syntax in a step-by-step fashion while
modelling an Italian-English translation service. By means of this scenario, we discuss
some verification problems and present the major intuitions underlying the symbolic op-
erational semantics for COWS. For the time being, we use a monadic variant of COWS,
i.e. we assume that invoke and receive activities can carry one single parameter at a time.
In fact, for the sake of presentation, the symbolic semantics is introduced for the monadic
variant in Section 4, and is then extended to polyadic communication in Section 5.2.
Let us consider a service that provides to its customers an Italian-English translation
service. Specifically, when the service is invoked by a customer, that communicates first her
partner name and then an Italian word, it replies to the request with either the corresponding
English word or the string “unknown word”. A high-level specification of the service can
be rendered in COWS as follows:
[x] t • req?x . [y] t • word?y . x • resp!trans(y) (1)
where t is the translation service partner name, req, word and resp are operation names, x
and y are variables that store the customer partner name and the Italian word to be translated
respectively, and trans( ) is a total function that maps a large subset of Italian words to the
corresponding English ones and returns the string “unknown word” for all words that do
not appear in the Italian words set. The service simply performs a sequence of two receive
activities t • req?x and t • word?y, corresponding to reception of a request and of an Italian
word sent by a customer, and replies with the translated word, by invoking the operation
resp of the customer by means of the invoke activity x • resp!trans(y). Receives and invokes
are the basic communication activities provided by COWS. Besides input parameters and
sent values, they indicate the endpoint, i.e. a pair p • o made of a partner name p and an
operation name o, through which the communication should occur. Differently from most
process calculi, receive activities in COWS bind neither names nor variables. The only
binding construct is delimitation: [d] s binds the delimited element d in the scope s (the
notions of bound and free occurrences of a delimited element are defined accordingly). For
example, the service (1) uses the delimitation operator to declare the scope of variables x
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and y. An inter-service communication takes place when the arguments of a receive and
of a concurrent invoke along the same endpoint do match, and causes replacement of the
variables arguments of the receive with the corresponding values arguments of the invoke
(within the scope of variables declarations). For example, variable x will be initialised by
the first receive activity with data provided by a customer.
At a lower level, the service could be described in terms of three entities composed by
using the parallel composition operator | that allows them to be concurrently executed
and to interact with each other. A low-level COWS specification of the translation service
can be
[reqDB1, reqDB2, respDB1, respDB2] ( Translator | DB1 | DB2 ) (2)
The delimitation operator is used here to declare that reqDB1, reqDB2, respDB1 and
respDB2 are private operation names known to the three components Translator, DB1 and
DB2, and only to them (at least initially, since during a computation private names can be
exported exactly as in π-calculus). The three subservices are defined as follows:
Translator , [x] t • req?x . [y] t • word?y .
[k] ( t • reqDB1!y | [x1] t • respDB1?x1 . ( kill(k) | {|x • resp!x1|} )
| t • reqDB2!y | [x2] t • respDB2?x2 . ( kill(k) | {|x • resp!x2|} ) )
DB1 , t • reqDB1?“a”. t • respDB1!“to”
+ t • reqDB1?“albero”. t • respDB1!“tree”
+ . . . + t • reqDB1?“zucca”. t • respDB1!“pumpkin”
DB2 , [z] ( t • reqDB2?z. t • respDB2!“unknown word”
+ t • reqDB2?“a”. t • respDB2!“to”
+ t • reqDB2?“abate”. t • respDB2!“abbot”
+ . . . + t • reqDB2?“zuppo”. t • respDB2!“soaked” )
Service Translator is publicly invocable and can interact with customers other than with
the ‘internal’ services DB1 and DB2. These latter two services, instead, can only be in-
voked by Translator (indeed, all the operations used by them are restricted) and have the
task of looking up in databases the English word corresponding to a given Italian one and
replying accordingly. In particular, DB1 performs a quick search in a small database of
commonly used words, while DB2 performs a slower search in a bigger database (that ex-
actly corresponds to that modelled by the function trans( )). After the two initial receives,
for e.g. performance or fault tolerance purposes, Translator invokes services DB1 and DB2
concurrently. When one of them replies, Translator immediately stops the other search.
This is done by executing the kill activity kill(k), that forces termination of all unprotected
parallel terms inside the enclosing [k] , that stops the killing effect. Then, Translator for-
wards the response to the customer and terminates. Kill activities are executed eagerly with
respect to the other parallel activities but critical code can be protected from the effect of
a forced termination by using the protection operator {| |}; this is indeed the case of the re-
sponse x • resp!x1 in our example. Services DB1 and DB2 use the choice operator + to
offer alternative behaviours: one of them can be selected by executing an invoke matching
the receive leading the behaviour. In case the word to be translated is unknown, DB1 does
not reply, while DB2 returns the string “unknown word”. Indeed, the semantics of parallel
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Fig. 1. LTS and symbolic LTS for the translation service (high-level specification)
composition avoids that DB2 returns “unknown word” in case of known words. This is
done by assigning the receive t • reqDB2?z less priority than the other receive activities, so
that it is only executed when none of the other receives matches the word to be translated
(see Section 3 for further details about the prioritised semantics of COWS).
Equivalence and model checkers, and other similar verification tools, do not work di-
rectly on syntactic specifications such as those above, but rather on more abstract represen-
tations of the behaviour of processes. Thus, using an inappropriate representation can lead
to unfeasible verifications. In the rest of the section, we discuss verification problems and
how to cope with them by exploiting a symbolic approach.
Verification problems. When the considered specification language is a value-passing pro-
cess algebra and the value-space is infinite, using standard Labelled Transition Systems
(LTSs) for the semantics can lead to infinite representations. For example, the operational
behaviour of service (1) can be represented by the infinite LTS in the left-hand side of
Figure 1, where nodes denote states and edges denote transitions between states implic-
itly oriented from top to bottom. Notably, for the sake of presentation, the LTSs shown in
the figures rely on an operational semantics in early style, where substitutions are applied
when receive actions are inferred. However, the problem of infinite representations remains
also in case of late semantics, due to the fact that the continuation of a receive action with
argument a variable x has to be considered under all possible substitutions for x.
The symbolic approach. To tackle the problems above, in [13] Hennessy and Lin have
introduced the so-called symbolic LTSs and used them to define finite semantical represen-
tations of terms of the value-passing CCS. For example, the symbolic LTSs corresponding
to the COWS service (1) is shown in the right-hand side of Figure 1. The symbolic actions
t • req?x and t • word?y denote reception of unknown values x and y along endpoints t • req
and t • word, respectively; the condition-guarded symbolic action (z = trans(y) , x • resp!z)
denotes sending of an unknown value z such that z = trans(y). Of course, for the same
reasons, also the LTS representing the behaviour of service (2) is infinite, while the cor-
responding symbolic LTS is finite. Indeed, if for the sake of presentation we assume that
database DB1 contains only the association for word “a” and database DB2 contains only
the associations for “a” and “abate”, the symbolic LTS representing (2) is that shown in
Figure 2.
Applying the symbolic approach to COWS. The main contribution of this work is the
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Fig. 2. Symbolic LTS for the (simplified) translation service (low-level specification)
development of a symbolic operational semantics for COWS. To achieve this goal, the main
issue is to give receive activities a proper semantics, because variables in their arguments
are placeholders for something to be received. For example, let us consider the service
p • o?x.s. If p • o?x.s
p •o?x
−−−−−−→ s then the behaviour of the continuation service s must be
considered under all substitutions of the form {x 7→ v} (i.e. the semantics of s can intuitively
be thought of as a function λx. s from values to services). In case of the standard semantics
for π-calculus [20], for example, this problem is not tackled at the operational semantics
level, but it is postponed to the observational semantics level. In fact, in the definition of late
bisimulation for π-calculus, whenever P is bisimilar to Q, if P a(x)−−−−→ P′ then there is Q′
such that Q a(x)−−−−→ Q′ and P′{u/x} is bisimilar to Q′{u/x} for every u. Thus, continuations
P′ and Q′ are considered under all substitutions for x. Instead, here we aim at defining an
operational semantics for COWS that properly handles input transitions, and allow finite
state LTSs to be associated to finite COWS terms.
The basic idea is to allow receive activities to evolve by performing a communication
with the ‘external world’ (i.e. a COWS context), this way they do not need to synchronise
with invoke activities within the considered term. To avoid infinite branching (as in the
case of early operational semantics), we replace variables with unknown values rather than
with specific values. We denote by x the unknown value for the variable x. This way, the
term [x] ( p • o?x. q • o′!x ) can evolve as follows:
[x] ( p • o?x. q • o′!x ) p •o ?[x]−−−−−−−−→ q • o′!x q
•o′!x
−−−−−−→ 0
Also receive activities having a value as argument (e.g. p • o?v) and invoke activities (e.g.
p • o!v) can evolve by communicating with the external world. Of course, these kinds of
communication do not produce substitutions.
When an external communication takes place, the behaviour of the continuation service
depends on the admittable values for the unknown value. To take care of the real values that
the unknown values can assume, we define a symbolic semantics for COWS, where the label
on each transition has two components: the condition that must hold for the transition to
be enabled and, as usual, the action of the transition. Moreover, to store the conditions that
must hold to reach a state and the names exported along the path, we define the semantics
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over configurations of the form Φ,∆ ⊢ s, called constrained services, where the condition
Φ and the set of names ∆ are used to determine the actions that s can perform. Thus,
the symbolic transitions are of the form Φ,∆ ⊢ s1 ≻
Φ′, α
−−−−→ Φ′,∆′ ⊢ s2, meaning “if the
condition Φ′ (such that Φ is a subterm ofΦ′) holds then s1 can perform the action α leading
to s2 by extending the set of exported private names ∆ to the set ∆′”.
The symbolic LTS associated to a COWS term conveys in a distilled form all the se-
mantics information on the behaviour of terms. More specifically, besides receive tran-
sitions, symbolic representations take into account generation and exportation of fresh
names, pattern-matching, expressions evaluation, and priorities among conflicting receives.
Dealing at once with all the above features at operational semantics level makes the devel-
opment of a symbolic semantics for COWS more complex than for more standard calculi,
such as value-passing CCS or π-calculus.
3 COWS and its standard operational semantics
COWS (Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services, [16]) is a recently designed pro-
cess calculus for specifying, combining and analyzing service-oriented applications, while
modelling their dynamic behaviour. COWS combines in an original way a number of in-
gredients borrowed from well-known process calculi, e.g. asynchronous communication,
polyadic synchronization, pattern matching, protection, delimited receiving and killing ac-
tivities, while resulting different from any of them. In this section, we present the standard
syntax and operational semantics of COWS. We refer the interested reader to [16] for many
examples illustrating COWS peculiarities and expressiveness, and for comparisons with
other process-based and orchestration formalisms.
The syntax of COWS is presented in Table 1. It is parameterized by three countable and
pairwise disjoint sets: the set of (killer) labels (ranged over by k, k′, . . .), the set of values
(ranged over by v, v′, . . . ) and the set of ‘write once’ variables (ranged over by x, y, . . . ).
The set of values is left unspecified; however, we assume that it includes the set of names,
ranged over by n, m, o, p, . . . , mainly used to represent partners and operations. The lan-
guage is also parameterized by a set of expressions, ranged over by e, whose exact syntax is
deliberately omitted. We just assume that expressions contain, at least, values and variables,
but do not include killer labels (that, hence, are non-communicable values). Partner names
and operation names can be combined to designate communication endpoints, written p • o,
and can be communicated, but dynamically received names can only be used for service
invocation (as in the Lπ [19]). Indeed, communication endpoints of receive activities are
identified statically because their syntax only allows using names and not variables.
We use w to range over values and variables, u to range over names and variables, and
d to range over killer labels, names and variables. Notation ·¯ stands for tuples of objects,
e.g. x¯ is a compact notation for denoting the tuple of variables 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 (with n ≥ 0).
We assume that variables in the same tuple are pairwise distinct. All notations shall extend
to tuples component-wise. We adopt the following conventions about the operators prece-
dence: monadic operators bind more tightly than parallel composition, and prefixing more
tightly than choice. In the sequel, we shall use n to range over communication endpoints
that do not contain variables (e.g. p • o), and u to range over communication endpoints
that may contain variables (e.g. u • u′). We will omit trailing occurrences of 0, writing e.g.
p • o?w¯ instead of p • o?w¯.0, and write [d1, . . . , dn] s in place of [d1] . . . [dn] s. We will write
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s ::= (services) g ::= (receive-guarded choice)
kill(k) (kill) 0 (nil)
| u • u′!e¯ (invoke) | p • o?w¯.s (request processing)
| g (receive-guarded choice) | g + g (choice)
| s | s (parallel composition)
| {|s|} (protection)
| [d] s (delimitation)
| ∗ s (replication)
Table 1
COWS syntax
I , s to assign a name I to the term s.
The only binding construct is delimitation: [d] s binds d in the scope s. In fact, to
enable concurrent threads within each service instance to share (part of) the state, receive
activities in COWS bind neither names nor variables, which is different from most process
calculi. Instead, the range of application of the substitutions generated by a communication
is regulated by the delimitation operator, that additionally permits to generate fresh names
(as the restriction operator of the π-calculus) and to delimit the field of action of kill activ-
ities. Thus, the occurrence of a name/variable/label is free if it is not under the scope of a
delimitation for it. We denote by fk(t) the set of killer labels that occur free in t, and by
fd(t) that of free names/variables/killer labels in t. Two terms are alpha-equivalent if one
can be obtained from the other by consistently renaming bound names/variables/labels. As
usual, we identify terms up to alpha-equivalence.
The operational semantics of COWS is defined only for closed services, i.e. services
without free variables/labels (similarly to many real programming language compilers, we
consider terms with free variables/labels as programming errors), but of course the rules
also involve non-closed services (see e.g. the premises of rules (delsub ) and (delkill)).
Formally, the semantics is given in terms of a structural congruence and of a labelled
transition relation. The structural congruence ≡ identifies syntactically different services
that intuitively represent the same service. It is defined as the least congruence relation
induced by a given set of equational laws. We explicitly show in Table 2 the laws for repli-
cation, protection and delimitation, while omit the (standard) laws for the other operators
stating that parallel composition is commutative, associative and has 0 as identity element,
and that guarded choice enjoys the same properties and, additionally, is idempotent. All
the presented laws are straightforward. In particular, commutativity of consecutive delimi-
tations implies that the order among the di in [〈d1, . . . , dn〉] s is irrelevant, thus in the sequel
we may use the simpler notation [d1, . . . , dn] s. Notably, the last law can be used to extend
the scope of names (like a similar law in the π-calculus), thus enabling communication of
restricted names, except when the argument d of the delimitation is a free killer label of s2
(this avoids involving s1 in the effect of a kill activity inside s2).
To define the labelled transition relation, we need a few auxiliary functions. First, we
exploit a function [[ ]] for evaluating closed expressions (i.e. expressions without variables):
it takes a closed expression and returns a value. However, [[ ]] cannot be explicitly defined
because the exact syntax of expressions is deliberately not specified.
Then, through the rules in Table 3, we define the partial function M( , ) that permits
performing pattern-matching on semi-structured data thus determining if a receive and an
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∗ 0 ≡ 0 ∗ s ≡ s | ∗ s {|0|} ≡ 0
{| {|s|} |} ≡ {|s|} {|[d] s|} ≡ [d] {|s|} [d] 0 ≡ 0
[d1] [d2] s ≡ [d2] [d1] s s1 | [d] s2 ≡ [d] (s1 | s2) if d < fd(s1)∪fk(s2)
Table 2
COWS structural congruence (excerpt of laws)
M(x, v) = {x 7→ v} M(v, v) = ∅ M(〈〉, 〈〉) = ∅
M(w1 , v1) = σ1 M(w¯2, v¯2) = σ2
M((w1, w¯2), (v1 , v¯2)) = σ1 ⊎ σ2
Table 3
Matching rules
invoke over the same endpoint can synchronize. The rules state that two tuples match if they
have the same number of fields and corresponding fields have matching values/variables.
Variables match any value, and two values match only if they are identical. When tuples
w¯ and v¯ do match, M(w¯, v¯) returns a substitution for the variables in w¯; otherwise, it is
undefined. Substitutions (ranged over by σ) are functions mapping variables to values and
are written as collections of pairs of the form x 7→ v. Application of substitution σ to s,
written s · σ, has the effect of replacing every free occurrence of x in s with v, for each
x 7→ v ∈ σ, by possibly using alpha conversion for avoiding v to be captured by name
delimitations within s. We use |σ | to denote the number of pairs in σ and σ1⊎σ2 to denote
the union of σ1 and σ2 when they have disjoint domains.
We also define a function, named halt( ), that takes a service s as an argument and
returns the service obtained by only retaining the protected activities inside s. halt( ) is
defined inductively on the syntax of services. The most significant case is halt({|s|}) =
{|s|}. In the other cases, halt( ) returns 0, except for parallel composition, delimitation and
replication operators, for which it acts as an homomorphism.
halt(kill(k)) = halt(u!e¯) = halt(g) = 0 halt({|s|}) = {|s|}
halt(s1 | s2) = halt(s1) | halt(s2) halt([d] s) = [d] halt(s) halt(∗ s) = ∗ halt(s)
Finally, in Table 4, we inductively define two predicates: noKill(s, d) holds true if either
d is not a killer label or d = k and s cannot immediately perform a free kill activity kill(k);
noConf(s, n, v¯, ℓ), with ℓ natural number, holds true if s does not produce communication
conflicts, i.e. s cannot immediately perform a receive activity over the endpoint n which
matches v¯ and generates a substitution with fewer pairs than ℓ.
The labelled transition relation α−−→ is the least relation over services induced by the
rules in Table 5, where label α is generated by the following grammar:
α ::= n ⊳ v¯ | n ⊲ w¯ | nσ ℓ v¯ | k | †
In the sequel, we use nvk(α) to denote the set of names, variables and killer labels occurring
in α, except for α = nσ ℓ v¯ for which we let nvk(nσ ℓ v¯) = nvk(σ), where nvk({x 7→ v}) =
{x} ∪ fd(v) and nvk(σ1 ⊎ σ2) = nvk(σ1) ∪ nvk(σ2).
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noKill(s, d) = true if fk(d) = ∅ noKill(s | s′, k) = noKill(s, k) ∧ noKill(s′, k)
noKill(kill(k), k) = false noKill([d] s, k) = noKill(s, k) if d , k
noKill(kill(k′), k) = true if k , k′ noKill([k] s, k) = true
noKill(u!e¯, k) = noKill(g, k) = true noKill({|s|}, k) = noKill(∗ s, k) = noKill(s, k)
noConf(kill(k), n, v¯, ℓ) = noConf(u!e¯, n, v¯, ℓ) = noConf(0, n, v¯, ℓ) = true
noConf(n′?w¯.s,n, v¯, ℓ) =
{
false if n′ = n ∧ |M(w¯, v¯) |< ℓ
true otherwise
noConf(g + g′, n, v¯, ℓ) = noConf(g, n, v¯, ℓ) ∧ noConf(g′, n, v¯, ℓ)
noConf(s | s′, n, v¯, ℓ) = noConf(s, n, v¯, ℓ) ∧ noConf(s′, n, v¯, ℓ)
noConf([d] s, n, v¯, ℓ) =
{
noConf(s, n, v¯, ℓ) if d < n
true otherwise
noConf({|s|}, n, v¯, ℓ) = noConf(∗ s, n, v¯, ℓ) = noConf(s, n, v¯, ℓ)
Table 4
There are not active kill(k) / There are not conflicting receives along n matching v¯
kill(k) k−−→ 0 (kill) n?w¯.s n⊲ w¯−−−−−→ s (rec)
[[e¯]] = v¯
(inv)
n!e¯
n⊳ v¯
−−−−−→ 0
g
α
−−−→ s
(choice)
g + g′
α
−−−→ s
s
nσ⊎{x7→v} ℓ v¯
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(delsub)
[x] s nσℓ v¯−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x 7→ v}
s
k
−−→ s′
(delkill)
[k] s †−−→ [k] s′
s
k
−−→ s′ k , d
(passk)
[d] s k−−→ [d] s′
s
†
−−→ s′
(pass†)
[d] s †−−→ [d] s′
s
α
−−−→ s′ d< nvk(α) α , k, † noKill(s, d)
(passα)
[d] s α−−−→ [d] s′
s ≡ s1 s1
α
−−−→ s2 s2 ≡ s
′
(cong)
s
α
−−−→ s′
s1
n⊲ w¯
−−−−−→s′1 s2
n⊳ v¯
−−−−−→s′2 M(w¯, v¯)=σ noConf(s1 | s2, n, v¯, |σ |)
(com)
s1 | s2
nσ |σ| v¯
−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2
s1
nσℓ v¯
−−−−−−→ s′1 noConf(s2, n, v¯, ℓ)
(parcon f )
s1 | s2
nσℓ v¯
−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s
α
−−−→ s′
(prot)
{|s|}
α
−−−→ {|s′ |}
s1
k
−−→ s′1
(parkill)
s1 | s2
k
−−→ s′1 | halt(s2)
s1
α
−−−→ s′1 α , k, nσℓ v¯
(parpass)
s1 | s2
α
−−−→ s′1 | s2
Table 5
COWS operational semantics
The meaning of labels is as follows: n ⊳ v¯ and n ⊲ w¯ denote execution of invoke and
receive activities over the endpoint n, respectively, nσ ℓ v¯ (if σ , ∅) denotes execution of
a communication over n with matching values v¯, generated substitution having ℓ pairs, and
substitution σ to be still applied, k denotes execution of a request for terminating a term
from within the delimitation [k] , † and n ∅ ℓ v¯ denote computational steps corresponding
to taking place of forced termination and communication (without pending substitutions),
respectively. Hence, a computation from a closed service s0 is a sequence of connected
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transitions of the form
s0
α1
−−−→ s1
α2
−−−→ s2
α3
−−−→ s3 . . .
where, for each i, αi is either † or n ∅ ℓ v¯ (for some n, ℓ and v¯); services si, for each i, will
be called reducts of s0.
We comment on salient points. Activity kill(k) forces termination of all unprotected
parallel activities (rules (kill) and (parkill)) inside an enclosing [k] , that stops the killing effect
by turning the transition label k into † (rule (delkill)). Existence of such delimitation is ensured
by the assumption that the semantics is only defined for closed services. Sensitive code can
be protected from killing by putting it into a protection {| |}; this way, {|s|} behaves like s
(rule (prot)). Similarly, [d] s behaves like s, except when the transition label α contains d
or when a free kill activity for d is active in s and α does not correspond to a kill activity
(rules (passk), (pass†) and (passα)): in such cases the transition should be derived by using rules
(delsub) or (delkill). In other words, kill activities are executed eagerly with respect to the other
activities inside the corresponding killer label delimitations.
A service invocation can proceed only if the expressions in the argument can be evalu-
ated (rule (inv)). A receive activity offers an invocable operation along a given partner name
(rule (rec)), and the execution of a receive permits to take a decision between alternative be-
haviours (rule (choice)). Communication can take place when two parallel services perform
matching receive and invoke activities (rule (com)). Communication generates a substitution
that is recorded in the transition label (for subsequent application), rather than a silent tran-
sition as in most process calculi. If more then one matching is possible, the receive that
needs fewer substitutions is selected to progress (rules (com) and (parcon f )). This mechanism,
based on pattern-matching, permits to correlate different service communications logically
forming a same interaction ‘session’ by means of their same contents and can be exploited
to model the precedence of a service instance over the corresponding service specification
when both can process the same request.
When the delimitation of a variable x argument of a receive is encountered, i.e. the
whole scope of the variable is determined, the delimitation is removed and the substitution
for x is applied to the term (rule (delsub)). Variable x disappears from the term and cannot
be reassigned a value. For this reason they are called ‘write once’ variables. Rule (cong) is
standard and states that structurally congruent services have the same transitions.
Execution of parallel services is interleaved (rule (parpass)), but when a kill activity or
a communication is performed. Indeed, the former must trigger termination of all paral-
lel services (according to rule (parkill)), while the latter must ensure that the receive activity
with greater priority progresses (rules (com) and (parcon f )). In practice, COWS parallel oper-
ator is equipped with a priority mechanism which allows some actions to take precedence
over others. Receive activities are assigned priority values which depend on the messages
available so that, in presence of concurrent matching receives, only a receive using a more
defined pattern (i.e. having greater priority) can proceed. This way, service definitions and
service instances are represented as processes running concurrently, but service instances
take precedence over the corresponding service definition when both can process the same
message, thus preventing creation of wrong new instances. Additionally, kill activities have
assigned greatest priority so that they pre-empt all other activities inside the enclosing killer
label’s delimitation and cause termination of those unprotected activities. This way, they
turn out to be quite useful for handling situations where abnormal termination is required,
like in case of fault and exception throw, or compensation invocation.
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4 A symbolic semantics for COWS
In this section, we introduce a symbolic operational semantics for COWS. For the sake of
simplicity, here we consider a monadic version of COWS, i.e. communication activities are
of the form u!e and n?w.s (we discuss in Section 5.2 how to tailor the symbolic semantics
to handle polyadic communication). Many illustrative examples shed light on the technical
development.
4.1 Symbolic operational semantics
The symbolic operational semantics of COWS is defined over configurations of the form
Φ,∆ ⊢ s, called constrained services, where Φ is the condition that must hold to reach the
current state, ∆ is the set of private names previously exported, and s is a service whose
actions are determined by Φ and ∆. The set ∆ will be omitted when empty, writing e.g.
Φ ⊢ s instead of Φ, ∅ ⊢ s. We define the semantics over an enriched set of services that
also includes those auxiliary terms resulting from replacing (free occurrences of) variables
with unknown values in terms produced by the syntax introduced in Section 3, where now
expressions contain also unknown values. Therefore, in the extended syntax we use u • u′!e
and p • o?w.s to denote invoke and receive activities respectively, x to denote unknown
values, and t to denote an unknown value or a term t (where t can be n, v, u, w, n or u).
As in the standard semantics, the only binding construct is delimitation: let
Φ,∆ ⊢ C[[[d] s]] be a constrained service (where C is a context 1 ), [d] binds d in the scope
s, in the condition Φ and in the set ∆. We denote by bn(t) the set of names that occur
bound in a term t, and by uvar(t) the set of variables that have been replaced by corre-
sponding unknown values in t (i.e. if x is an unknown value in t, then x ∈ uvar(t)). For
simplicity sake, in the sequel we assume that bound variables in constrained services are
pairwise distinct and different from variables corresponding to the unknown values of the
constrained services, and bound names are all distinct and different from the free ones (of
course, these conditions are not restrictive and can always be fulfilled by possibly using
alpha-conversion). This assumption avoids that distinct unknown values are denoted by
the same x in a condition Φ of a constrained service (see Example “Evaluation function,
condition x < uv and assumption on bound variables” in Section 4.2), and permits identi-
fying the name delimitation binding each private name within a condition Φ and a set ∆ of
a constrained service (see Remark 4.1).
The symbolic operational semantics of COWS is defined only for closed services, and
is given in terms of a structural congruence and of a (bi-)labelled transition relation. The
structural congruence ≡ is the trivial extension of that defined in Section 3 to the enriched
syntax of services used here. To define the labelled transition relation, we exploit the trivial
extension to the enriched syntax of function halt( ) and predicate noKill( , ) defined in
Section 3. We also extend function [[ ]] to deal with unknown values. Now, it takes a
closed expression and returns a pair (Φ, v): the (possibly unknown) value v is the result of
the evaluation provided that the condition Φ holds. Specifically, let e be an expression, if e
does not contain unknown values and can be computed, then [[e]] = (true, v) where v is the
result of the evaluation, as in the original COWS semantics. Similarly, if e is an unknown
value x, then [[e]] = (true, x). If e contains unknown values and is not a single unknown
1 A context C is a service with a ‘hole’ [[·]] such that, once the hole is filled with a service s, the resulting term C[[s]] is a
COWS service.
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value (i.e. e , x for every x), then [[e]] = ((y , bn ∧ y < uv ∧ y = e ∧ Φ′), y) where
y is a fresh unknown value that must be different from all private names (i.e. y , bn)
and from all existent unknown values (i.e. y < uv) 2 , and Φ′ is a condition that permits
dealing with expression operators partially defined 3 . Function [[ ]], and hence condition
Φ′, cannot be explicitly defined because the exact syntax of expressions is deliberately not
specified. Then, consider as an example the following simple language for expressions:
e ::= x | x | i | e + e | e − e | e ∗ e | e/e | (e)
where i is an integer value. For the above language function [[ ]] is such that:
• [[(5 − 2) ∗ 3]] = (true, 9);
• [[5 − x]] is undefined, because the expression 5 − x is not closed;
• [[5 − x]] = ((y , bn ∧ y < uv ∧ y = 5 − x), y);
• [[5/0]] is undefined;
• [[5/x]] = ((y , bn ∧ y < uv ∧ y = 5/x ∧ x , 0), y), where condition x , 0 is due to the
fact that operator / is not defined when its second argument is 0.
We also define a function confRec( , ), that takes a service s and an endpoint n as
an arguments and returns the set of (possibly unknown) values that are parameters of re-
ceive activities over the endpoint n active in s. This function plays the role of predicate
noConf( , , , ) of the standard semantics and, indeed, is exploited to disable transitions in
case of communication conflicts (by setting transition conditions to false). The function is
inductively defined as follows:
confRec(0, n) = confRec(kill(k), n) = confRec(u!e, n) = confRec(n?x.s, n) = ∅
confRec(g + g′, n) = confRec(g, n) ∪ confRec(g′, n) confRec(n?v.s, n) = { v }
confRec(n′?w.s, n) = ∅ if n , n′ confRec({|s|}, n) = confRec(s, n)
confRec(s | s′, n) = confRec(s, n) ∪ confRec(s′, n) confRec([d] s, n) = ∅ if d ∈ n
confRec([d] s, n) = confRec(s, n)\{d} if d < n confRec(∗ s, n) = confRec(s, n)
The labelled transition relation over constrained services, written ≻ Φ , α−−−−→, relies on a
labelled transition relation Φ , α−−−−−→, that is the least relation over services induced by the
rules in Table 6. Conditions Φ and actions α are generated by the following grammar:
Φ ::= true | false | v = v′ | v , v′ | x , bn | x < uv
| x < {xi}i∈I | x = e | Φ ∧ Φ
′
α ::= n ⊳ v | n ⊳ [n] | n ⊲ w | n ⊲ [x ] | nσ ℓ v | k | †
where, now, a substitutions σ can be either the empty substitution ∅ or a substitution {x 7→
v} that maps the variable x to the (possibly unknown) value v.
The meaning of labels is as follows:
2 Notably, here y can be any unknown value, provide that it satisfies conditions y , bn and y < uv. Notice that condition
y < uv is a syntactical condition on the variable name y. Later we shall explain the exact meaning of the above conditions
and show how they are evaluated in the last step of the inference of a transition.
3 Of course, if all operators used in the considered expression are total functions, then condition Φ′ is true.
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kill(k) true , k−−−−−−→ 0 (s-kill) n?w.s true ,n⊲w−−−−−−−−−→ s (s-rec)
s
Φ ,n⊲ x
−−−−−−−→ s′
(s-reccom)
[x] s Φ∧ x,bn∧ x, confRec(s,n) ,n ⊲[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x 7→ x}
g
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s
(s-choice)
g + g′
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s
[[e]] = (Φ, v )
(s-inv)
n!e
Φ ,n⊳ v
−−−−−−−→ 0
s
Φ ,n⊳ n
−−−−−−−→ s′ n<n
(s-open)
[n] s Φ , n⊳ [n]−−−−−−−−−→ s′
s
Φ ,n {x 7→v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(s-delsub)
[x] s Φ ,n ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x 7→ v}
s
Φ , k
−−−−−→ s′
(s-delkill)
[k] s Φ , †−−−−−→ [k] s′
s
Φ , k
−−−−−→ s′ k , d
(s-passk)
[d] s Φ , k−−−−−→ [d] s′
s
Φ , †
−−−−−→ s′
(s-pass†)
[d] s Φ , †−−−−−→ [d] s′
s
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′ d< nvk(α) α , k , † noKill(s, d)
(s-passα)
[d] s Φ , α−−−−−→ [d] s′
s
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′
(s-prot)
{|s|}
Φ , α
−−−−−→ {|s′ |}
s1
Φ1 ,n⊲ v′
−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 s2
Φ2 ,n′⊳ v
−−−−−−−−−→ s′2
(s-match)
s1 | s2
Φ1 ∧Φ2 ∧ n=n′ ∧ v′=v ,n ∅ 0 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2
s1
Φ1 ,n⊲ x
−−−−−−−−→ s′1 s2
Φ2 ,n′⊳ v
−−−−−−−−−→ s′2
(s-com)
s1 | s2
Φ1 ∧Φ2 ∧ n=n
′ ∧ v, confRec(s1 | s2 ,n) ,n {x7→v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2
s1
Φ ,nσ 1 v
−−−−−−−−−→ s′1
(s-parcon f 1)
s1 | s2
Φ∧ v, confRec(s2 ,n) ,nσ 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
Φ , k
−−−−−→ s′1
(s-parkill)
s1 | s2
Φ , k
−−−−−→ s′1 | halt(s2)
s1
Φ ,n ⊲[x ]
−−−−−−−−−→ s′1
(s-parcon f 2)
s1 | s2
Φ∧ x, confRec(s2 ,n) ,n ⊲[x ]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s ≡ s1 s1
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s2 s2 ≡ s
′
(s-cong)
s
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′
s1
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′1 α , k , nσ 1 v , n ⊲ [x ]
(s-parpass)
s1 | s2
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
Table 6
COWS symbolic semantics (rules for Φ , α−−−−→)
• Conditions: true (resp. false) denotes the condition always (resp. never) satisfied, v = v′
(resp. v , v′) denotes an equality (resp. inequality) between (possibly unknown) values,
x , bn means that the unknown value x must be different from all bound names of the
considered service, x < uv means that the set of variables corresponding to the unknown
values of the considered constrained service may not contain the variable x, x < {xi}i∈I
means that x must not be in the set {xi}i∈I , x = e states that the unknown value x is equal
to the evaluation of the closed non-evaluable expression e (conditions of this form are
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generated by the evaluation function, e.g. condition y = 5/x is generated by evaluation
of expression 5/x), and as usual ∧ denotes the logic conjunction. In the sequel, we will
use notation v , {v 1, . . . , v n} to indicate the condition v , v 1 ∧ . . . ∧ v , v n (where
v , ∅ indicates true). Moreover, we will use a function B( , , ) that, given a condition
Φ, a service s and a set of variables {xi}i∈I , returns a condition obtained by conjuncting
Φ with all inequalities between the unknown values of Φ and the bound names of s and
with all conditions x < {xi}i∈I for each x < uv in Φ. Formally, B( , , ) is defined as
follows:
B(true, s, {xi}i∈I) = true B(false, s, {xi}i∈I) = false
B(v = v′, s, {xi}i∈I) = v = v′ B(v , v′, s, {xi}i∈I) = v , v′
B(x , bn, s, {xi}i∈I) = x , bn ∧ x , bn(s) B(x < uv, s, {xi}i∈I) = x < {xi}i∈I
B(x < {y j} j∈J , s, {xi}i∈I) = x < {y j} j∈J B(x = e, s, {xi}i∈I) = x = e
B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s, {xi}i∈I) = B(Φ, s, {xi}i∈I) ∧ B(Φ′, s, {xi}i∈I)
• Actions: n⊳ [n] denotes execution of a bound invoke activity over the endpoint n, while
n ⊲ [x ] denotes taking place of external communication over the endpoint n with receive
parameter x (that will be replaced by the unknown value x). The remaining labels have
the usual meaning. Notably, due to the restraint on monadic communication, here the
natural number ℓ can only be either 0 or 1.
We comment on the aspects of the symbolic semantics rules that mainly differ from
the standard ones. Bound invocations, that transmit private names, can be generated by
rule (s-open). Notably, bound invocation actions do not appear in rules (s-match) and (s-com), and
therefore cannot directly interact with receive actions. Such interactions are instead inferred
by using structural congruence to pull name delimitation outside both interacting activities.
Although the bound transitions and rule (s-open) can be omitted, we include them both to
give a proper semantics to terms [n] n!n and to support the development of behavioural
equivalences for COWS. Communication can be internal or external to the service. Internal
communication can take place when two matching receive and invoke activities (rules (s-
match) and (s-com)) are simultaneously executed. External communication can take place
when a value is transmitted to the environment (rules (s-inv) and (s-open)) or when a receive
activity matches an unknown value provided by the environment (rules (s-rec) and (s-reccom)).
Differently from the standard semantics, conflicting receives cannot be dealt with by using
a predicate in the premises of rules for communication and interleaving, because unknown
values can be involved. Here, the check for conflicting receives is simply a condition of the
form v , confRec(s, n) (rules (s-reccom), (s-com), (s-parcon f 1)) and (s-parcon f 2)).
The labelled transition relation ≻
Φ , α
−−−−→ is the least relation over constrained services
induced by the rules reported in Table 7, where notation n < ∆ means that set ∆ does not
contain the names of endpoint n. Rule (constServ) states that a constrained service Φ,∆ ⊢ s
can perform all the ‘non-invoke’ transitions performed by s with an enriched condition
Φ′′ obtained by composing Φ and the condition on the label Φ′. Condition Φ′′ takes care
of the relationship between unknown values and private names. Indeed, by private names
definition, each unknown value, that is a value coming from the environment, must be
different from all bound (private) names of the considered service. If the transition s Φ
′, α
−−−−−→
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s
Φ′ , α
−−−−−→ s′ α , n ⊳ [n] , n ⊳ v Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ))
(constServ)
Φ,∆ ⊢ s ≻
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ⊢ s′
s
Φ′ , n⊳ [n]
−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ n<∆ Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ))
(constServexp )
Φ,∆ ⊢ s ≻
Φ′′ , n⊳ [n]
−−−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ∪ {n} ⊢ s′
s
Φ′ , n⊳ v
−−−−−−−−→ s′ n<∆ Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ))
(constServinv )
Φ,∆ ⊢ s ≻
Φ′′ , n⊳ v
−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ⊢ s′
Table 7
COWS symbolic semantics (rules for ≻ Φ , α−−−−→)
s′ introduces a new unknown value x (rules (s-inv) and (s-reccom)), it is not sufficient to add the
condition x , bn(s′) (i.e. the unknown value is different from all bound names of the
current service), but we need also to consider bound names that could be subsequently
generated. For example, let us consider the following transition:
true ⊢ [x] n?x.s | ∗ [n] n′!n ≻ x,bn∧ x,n , n⊲[x ]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ∧ x , n ⊢ s·{x 7→ x} | ∗ [n] n′!n
Now, if the obtained service performs the transition:
s · {x 7→ x} | ∗ [n] n′!n Φ , α−−−−−→ s′ · {x 7→ x} | ∗ [n] n′!n | [n′] n′!n′ | [n′′] n′!n′′
then, let Φ′ ⊢ s′′ be the obtained constrained service, the condition Φ′ must contain x , n′
and x , n′′. To update after any transition the condition of a constrained service with
inequalities between unknown values and private names, we use the condition x , bn,
that simply states that x has been introduced in the considered term (rules (s-inv) and (s-
reccom)), and function B( , , ), that adds the inequalities for each unknown value (rules (con-
stServ), (constServexp ) and (constServinv)). Moreover, function B( , , ) adds conditions of the form
x < {xi}i∈I to guarantee that unknown values introduced by rule (s-inv) because expression
evaluation differ from those of the considered constrained service (i.e. uvar(Φ) if the con-
strained service is Φ,∆ ⊢ s; for further details see Example “Evaluation function, condition
x < uv and assumption on bound variables” in Section 4.2).
Rules (constServexp ) and (constServinv ) deal with the localized receiving feature of COWS.
Indeed, if a COWS term communicates a private (partner or operation) name to the envi-
ronment, then the latter (that is a COWS context) can use the name to define a sending
endpoint, but not a receiving one. For example, consider the following constrained service:
true ⊢ [p] ( q • o!p | p • o′!v )
It can perform the activity q • o!p (rule (s-open)) and become the term true, {p} ⊢ p • o′!v
which is stuck. In fact, to further evolve it needs the environment to be able to perform
first a receive q • o?x and then a receive along the endpoint x • o′, that is disallowed by the
syntax. Therefore, to block invoke activities performed along endpoints using previously
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exported private names, we record all exported private names in the set ∆ of the constrained
service and perform the check n<∆ when an invoke activity along n communicating with
the environment is executed.
Remark 4.1 The assumption “bound names are all distinct and different from the free
ones” is used to guarantee the correlation between conditions and services. For example,
if we do not rely on this assumption, for the constrained service x , n ⊢ [n] s | [n] s′ we
are not able to understand what are the occurrences of n referred by the condition x , n.
Moreover, the definition of bound names permits maintaining this correlation. For example,
the constrained service x , n ⊢ [n] x • o!n is not not alpha-equivalent to x , n ⊢ [m] x • o!m
but is equivalent to x , m ⊢ [m] x • o!m.
Remark 4.2 It is worth noticing that, in the definition of relation ≻ Φ , α−−−−→, the conditions
are never evaluated. Thus, at operational semantics level, we do not distinguish unfeasible
transitions (whose condition holds false) from feasible ones. For example, transitions hav-
ing the following conditions are unfeasible: (oreq = oresp), (x , x) and (x = y ∧ x , y). Of
course, to identify unfeasible transitions, we can replace the condition Φ′′ in the conclu-
sion of rules (constServ), (constServexp ) and (constServinv ) with E(Φ′′), where E( ) is a function for
evaluating conditions.
Remark 4.3 Since the transition relation ≻ Φ , α−−−−→ is defined over constrained services, i.e.
configuration of the form Φ,∆ ⊢ s, the operational semantics can be naturally interpreted
on L2TS [10]. Indeed, each edge label (of the form Φ, α) indicates the condition which
must hold for the transition to be enabled and the performed action, while each state label
(of the form Φ,∆) indicates the condition which must hold to reach the considered state
from the initial one and the set of previously exported private names.
We can now formalize the correspondence between the original semantics introduced
in Section 3 and the symbolic semantics. We exploit here a function E( ) for evaluating
conditions: it takes a condition Φ and returns false if certainly Φ does not hold; otherwise,
it returns Φ. For example, E(Φ′ ∧ (5 = 3)) is false whatever Φ′ may be. Since a condition
Φ can be of the form x = e and the syntax of expressions e is not specified, function E( )
cannot be explicitly defined (as function [[ ]]). For the proof of semantics correspondence,
we use the following lemma concerning function B( , , ). For the sake of simplicity, a
condition Φ is deemed favourable if uvar(Φ) = ∅ and E(Φ) , false, i.e. it does not contain
unknown values and can be positively evaluated.
Lemma 4.4 Let Φ be a favourable condition, then E(B(Φ, s, ∅)) , false for any s.
Proof. Function B( , , ) acts as an homomorphism on the first argument, except when the
argument is x , bn and x < uv. We do not need to consider the former case because, by the
hypothesis uvar(Φ) = ∅, we have that Φ does not contain unknown values. For the latter
case, we get that B(x < uv, s, ∅) = x < uv since the third argument of B( , , ) is ∅. Thus,
the thesis trivially follows by the fact that, under the considered hypotheses, B( , , ) acts
always as an homomorphism on the first argument. 
Our major result is a theorem of ‘operational correspondence’. It is quite standard and
states that for each transition of the original LTS associated to a COWS term there exists
a corresponding symbolic transition of the symbolic LTS that does not involve unknown
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values and bound names, and vice versa. Notice that, since the original semantics does
not take bound invocations into account, only constrained services of the form Φ ⊢ s are
considered in the theorem.
Theorem 4.5 Let uvar(α) = ∅ and α , n ⊳ [n] . s α−−→ s′ if and only if, for any favourable
condition Φ, Φ ⊢ s ≻ Φ
′ , α
−−−−→ Φ′ ⊢ s′ for some favourable condition Φ′.
Proof. The proof of the “if” part proceeds by induction on the length of the inference
of s
α
−−−→ s′. For the base case, we reason by case analysis on the axioms of the original
operational semantics.
(kill) In this case, α = k, s = kill(k) and s′ = 0. By rule (s-kill), kill(k) true , k−−−−−−→ 0. Then,
by rule (constServ), we get that Φ ⊢ kill(k) ≻ Φ
′ , k
−−−−→ Φ′ ⊢ 0, where Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ true, 0, ∅)
(since uvar(Φ) = ∅). By definition, B(Φ ∧ true, 0, ∅) = B(Φ, 0, ∅) ∧ B(true, 0, ∅). Since
Φ is favourable, by Lemma 4.4, we have that E(B(Φ, 0, ∅)) , false. Since B(true, 0, ∅) =
true , false, we can conclude that E(Φ′) , false.
(rec) In this case, α = n ⊲ w and s = n?w.s′. By rule (s-rec), n?w.s′ true , n⊲w−−−−−−−−−→ s′. Then, by
rule (constServ), we get that Φ ⊢ n?w.s′ ≻
Φ′ , n⊲w
−−−−−−−→ Φ′ ⊢ s′, where Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ true, 0, ∅).
As before, we can conclude that E(Φ′) , false.
(inv) In this case, α = n ⊳ v¯, s = n!e where [[e]] = v, and s′ = 0. By rule (s-inv),
n!e¯
true , n⊳ v
−−−−−−−−−→ 0. Then, by rule (constServinv ), we get that Φ ⊢ n!e ≻
Φ′ ,n⊳ v
−−−−−−−→ Φ′ ⊢ 0,
where Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ true, 0, ∅). As before, we can conclude that E(Φ′) , false.
For the inductive step, we reason by case analysis on the last applied inference rule of the
original operational semantics.
(choice) In this case, s = g + g′. By the premise of the rule (choice), g
α
−−→ s′. By induction,
Φ ⊢ g ≻
Φ′ , α
−−−−→ Φ′ ⊢ s′ for some favourable conditions Φ and Φ′. By the premise of the
rule (constServ), we get that g
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−−→ s′ where Φ′′ is such that Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′′, s′, ∅). By
rule (s-choice), g + g′
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−−→ s′. Finally, by rule (constServ), we can conclude Φ ⊢ g + g′ ≻
Φ′ , α
−−−−−→ Φ′ ⊢ s′.
(delsub) In this case, s = [x] s1 and s′ = s2 · {x 7→ v}. By the premise of the rule (delsub),
s1
n {x7→v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−→ s2. By induction, we get that Φ ⊢ s1 ≻
Φ′ ,n {x7→v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−→ Φ′ ⊢ s2 for
some favourable conditions Φ and Φ′. By the premise of rule (constServ), we get that
s1
Φ′′ ,n {x7→v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s2 and, by rule (delsub), [x] s1
Φ′′ , n ∅ 1 v
−−−−−−−−−→ s2 · {x 7→ v}. Finally, by rule
(constServ), we can conclude.
(delkill), (passk), (pass†), (passα), (cong), (prot), (parkill), (parpass), (parcon f ) These cases are similar to the
previous one; the latter case relies on the fact that noConf(s2, n, v, 1) = true implies that
confRec(s2, n) = {vi}i∈I such that v , vi for all i ∈ I.
(com) In this case, s = (s1 | s2) and s′ = (s′1 | s′2). First, we consider the case α = n ∅ 0 v.
By the premises of rule (com), s1
n⊲ v
−−−−−→ s′1 and s2
n⊳ v
−−−−−→ s′2. By induction, we get
that Φ1 ⊢ s1 ≻
Φ′1 , n⊲ v
−−−−−−−→ Φ′1 ⊢ s
′
1 and Φ2 ⊢ s2 ≻
Φ′2 , n⊳ v
−−−−−−−→ Φ′2 ⊢ s
′
2, for some favourable
conditions Φ1, Φ′1, Φ2 and Φ
′
2. By the premises of rules (constServ) and (constServinv ), we get
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that s1
Φ′′1 , n⊲ v
−−−−−−−−→ s′1 and s2
Φ′′2 , n⊳ v
−−−−−−−−→ s′2, where conditions Φ
′′
1 and Φ
′′
2 are such that
Φ′1 = B(Φ1 ∧ Φ′′1 , s′1, ∅) and Φ′2 = B(Φ2 ∧ Φ′′2 , s′2, ∅). By rule (s-com), s1 | s2
Φ′ ,n ∅ 0 v
−−−−−−−−−→
s′1 | s
′
2, where Φ
′ = Φ′′1 ∧Φ
′′
2 ∧ n = n∧ v = v. Finally, by rule (constServ), we can conclude
that Φ ⊢ s1 | s2 ≻
Φ′′ , n ∅ 0 v
−−−−−−−−→ Φ′′ ⊢ s′1 | s
′
2, where Φ
′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′1 | s′2, ∅). The case
α = nσ 1 v proceeds as above, by also relying on the fact that noConf(s1 | s2, n, v, 1) =
true implies that confRec(s1 | s2, n) = {vi}i∈I with v , vi for all i ∈ I.
Consider now the “only if” part of the theorem. By the premises of rules (constServ)
and (constServinv), we get that s
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−−→ s′ where Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′′, s′, ∅). By hypothesis
E(Φ′) , false, hence E(Φ′′) , false too. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of
the inference of s
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−−→ s′. We omit the details because the proof proceeds as that of the
“if” part, but the steps are executed in the reverse order. For the base case, we reason by
case analysis on the axioms of the symbolic operational semantics. We take a look at one
base case:
(s-rec) In this case, Φ′′ = true, α = n ⊲ w and s = n?w.s′. Trivially, by rule (rec),
n?w.s′
n⊲w
−−−−−→ s′.
For the inductive step, we reason by case analysis on the last applied inference rule of the
symbolic operational semantics. We take a look at two cases:
(s-choice) In this case, s = g + g′. By the premise of the rule (s-choice), g
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−−→ s′. By
induction, we get that g α−−−→ s′. Finally, by rule (choice), we can conclude g + g′ α−−→ s′.
(s-com) In this case, s = (s1 | s2), Φ′′ = (Φ1 ∧ Φ2 ∧ n = n ∧ v , confRec(s1 | s2, n)),
α = n {x 7→ v} 1 v and s′ = (s′1 | s′2). Since E(Φ′′) , false, we get that E(Φ1) , false,
E(Φ2) , false and confRec(s1 | s2, n) = {vi}i∈I such that v , vi for all i ∈ I. This
means that noConf(s1 | s2, n, v, 1) holds true. By induction and since E(Φ1) , false and
E(Φ2) , false, we have that s1 n⊲ x−−−−−→ s′1 and s2
n⊳ v
−−−−−→ s′2. Thus, by rule (com), we can
conclude that s1 | s2
n {x7→v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2.

4.2 Examples
In this section, we show some simple examples aimed at clarifying some peculiarities of
COWS symbolic semantics. In the sequel, for the sake of readability, we shall evaluate
conditions, writing e.g. x , n instead of (p = p ∧ o = o ∧ true ∧ x , n).
External communication
According to the operational semantics introduced in Section 3, the service [x] n?x. m!x can
perform the receive activity, but then it is blocked (because variable x is not instantiated by
the receive transition). Instead, according to the symbolic semantics defined in this section,
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the constrained service true ⊢ [x] n?x. m!x can evolve as follows:
(s-rec)
n?x. m!x
true , n⊲ x
−−−−−−−−−→ m!x
(s-reccom)
[x] n?x. m!x x,confRec((n?x. m!x),n)∧ x,bn , n⊲[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ m!x
(constServ)
true ⊢ [x] n?x. m!x ≻ x,bn , n⊲[x]−−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ⊢ m!x
since (x , confRec((n?x. m!x), n)) = (x , ∅) = true. Then, the continuation can perform
the following transition:
[[x]] = (true, x)
(s-inv)
m!x
true , m⊳ x
−−−−−−−−−→ 0
(constServinv)
x , bn ⊢ m!x ≻
x,bn , m⊳ x
−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ⊢ 0
Notice that, although the external communication generates the condition x , bn (that
means that the received unknown value must be different from all delimited names), the
condition is never exploited because the term does not contain delimited names.
External communication within name delimitations
Consider the constrained service true ⊢ [n] [x] n?x. x • o!n. Differently from the previous
example, the above service contains a delimited name (i.e. n). Thus, this time, condition
x , bn is exploited to generate the specific condition x , n. Indeed, the service evolves as
follows:
(s-rec)
n?x. x • o!n
true , n⊲ x
−−−−−−−−−→ x • o!n
(s-reccom)
[x] n?x. x • o!n x,confRec((n?x. x
• o!n),n)∧ x,bn , n⊲[x]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x • o!n
(s-delpass)
[n] [x] n?x. x • o!n x,confRec((n?x. x
• o!n),n)∧ x,bn , n⊲[x]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [n] x • o!n
(constServ)
true ⊢ [n] [x] n?x. x • o!n ≻ x,n∧ x,bn , n⊲[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x , n ∧ x , bn ⊢ [n] x • o!n
since (x , confRec((n?x. x • o!n), n) = true and B(x , bn, ([n] [x] n?x. x • o!n), ∅) = x ,
n ∧ x , bn. Then, the continuation can evolve only provided that condition x , n holds.
Internal communication
Consider the constrained service true ⊢ [p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v ), where p < n. In
this case, due to the delimitation [p] , the receive activity cannot communicate with the
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environment, but can synchronize with the internal invoke:
(s-rec)
p • o?x. n!x
true , p •o⊲x
−−−−−−−−−−−→ n!x
[[v]] = (true, v)
(s-inv)
p • o!v
true , p •o⊳v
−−−−−−−−−−→ 0
(s-com)
p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v
Φ , p •o {x7→v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ n!x
(s-delsub)
[x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v ) Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−→ n!x · {x 7→ v}
(s-delpass)
[p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v ) Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−→ [p] n!v ≡ n!v
(s-cong)
[p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v ) Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−→ n!v
(constServ)
true ⊢ [p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v ) ≻ Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−→ Φ ⊢ n!v
where Φ = ( true ∧ true ∧ p = p ∧ o = o ∧ v , confRec(p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v, p • o) ).
Since confRec(p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v, p • o) = ∅, condition Φ holds true.
External and internal communication
Consider the constrained service true ⊢ [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v ). In this case, both internal and
external communication can take place. Its initial transitions are the following:
(ext. com.) true ⊢ [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v ) ≻ Φ ,n⊲[x]−−−−−−−−→ Φ ⊢ m!x | n!v
(ext. com.) true ⊢ [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v ) ≻ Φ ,n⊳ v−−−−−−→ Φ ⊢ [x] ( n?x. m!x )
(int. com.) true ⊢ [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v ) ≻ Φ ,n ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−→ Φ ⊢ m!v
Conflicting receive
Consider the constrained service true ⊢ [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ). Due to the presence of
the receive n?v, that has greater priority to synchronize with an invocation n!v, the receive
n?x can communicate with the environment only if the received value is not v (indeed,
confRec((n?v | n?x | n!v), n) = {v} ):
true ⊢ [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ) ≻ x,bn∧ x,v , n⊲[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ∧ x , v ⊢ n?v | n!v
Other possible transitions are as follows:
true ⊢ [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ) ≻ true ,n⊳ v−−−−−−−−→ true ⊢ [x] ( n?v | n?x )
true ⊢ [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ) ≻ true ,n⊲ v−−−−−−−−→ true ⊢ [x] ( n?x | n!v )
true ⊢ [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ) ≻ true ,n ∅ 0 v−−−−−−−−−→ true ⊢ [x] n?x
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On constrained services
Consider the (plain) service [x, y] ( n?q | n?x | x • o!v | q • o?y ) where n , q • o. It can
perform the following transition:
[x, y] ( n?q | n?x | x • o!v | q • o?y ) x,bn∧ x,q , n⊲[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [y] ( n?q | x • o!v | q • o?y )
The obtained service can further perform the following transition:
[y] ( n?q | x • o!v | q • o?y ) x=q , q •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−→ n?q
Condition x = q of this transition contradicts condition x , q of the previous one, but the
service can however evolve. Instead, by using constrained services, we would have:
true ⊢ [x, y] ( n?q | n?x | x • o!v | q • o?y ) ≻ x,bn∧ x,q , n⊲[x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
x , bn ∧ x , q ⊢ [y] ( n?q | x • o!v | q • o?y ) ≻ x=q∧ x,bn∧ x,q , q •o ∅ 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ false ⊢ n?q
because x = q ∧ x , q holds false, and the second transition could not be performed. That’s
why we use constrained services.
Evaluation function, condition x < uv and assumption on bound variables
Consider the service s , [y, z] ( n!(5 + x) | n?y.s′ | m?z. m′!z′ ), where n , m , m′. If
[[5 + x]] = ((r , bn ∧ r < uv ∧ r = 5 + x), r) then
n!(5 + x) (r,bn∧ r<uv∧ r=5+x) , n⊳ r−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 0
Therefore, the constrained service x , bn ∧ x′ , bn ∧ z′ , bn ⊢ s can evolve as follows:
x , bn ∧ x′ , bn ∧ z′ , bn ⊢ s ≻
Φ′ ,n ∅ 1 r
−−−−−−−−→ Φ′ ⊢ [z] (s′ · {y 7→ r} | m?z. m′!z′ )︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
s′′
for Φ′ = B((x , bn ∧ x′ , bn ∧ z′ , bn ∧ r , bn ∧ r < uv ∧ r = 5+ x), s′′, {x, x′, z′}) =
(x , bn ∧ x′ , bn ∧ z′ , bn ∧ r , bn ∧ r < {x, x′, z′} ∧ r = 5 + x). Now, we cannot
alpha-convert variable z into r, because we would violate the assumption that bound vari-
ables differ from variables corresponding to unknown values (in this case, variable z must
be different from r because r is an unknown value occurring in the constrained service).
Similarly, if [[5 + x]] = ((z , bn ∧ z < uv ∧ z = 5 + x), z), then the constrained service
could become
Φ′′ ⊢ [z] (s′ · {y 7→ z} | m?z. m′!z′ )
for some Φ′′, but the assumption would be violated again (because the service contains
both z and z). Finally, if [[5 + x]] = ((z′ , bn ∧ z′ < uv ∧ z′ = 5 + x), z′), i.e. the unknown
value returned by the evaluation function is not fresh, then the condition on the symbolic
transition holds false, because z′ < {x, x′, z′} does not hold.
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5 Extensions of the symbolic operational semantics
In this section, we present two extensions of COWS symbolic semantics for dealing with
open terms and polyadic communication.
5.1 Symbolic semantics for open terms
The symbolic operational semantics presented in Section 4 is defined only for closed terms.
Indeed, for a reduction semantics it is reasonable that well-formed services may not contain
free variables and labels. However, in order to be able to inspect also the behaviour of a
part of a service, we need to define the semantics also for open terms.
For example, let us consider the following open term:
n?x | n!x
The term can only perform the receive activity n?x (by communicating with the environ-
ment), because activity n!x is stuck until variable x is not replaced by a value. However,
since the scope of the variable is not declared in the term, the environment can substitute
the variable with an unknown value in any moment. The resulting term is as follows:
n?x | n!x
Now, the term can perform also the activity n!x (by communicating with the environment)
and the internal communication (activities n?x and n!x synchronize).
Formally, the symbolic operational semantics for open terms is defined by the rules in
Table 6 and the new rules in Table 8, where the transition label x represents execution of a
substitution by the environment. We denote by fv(t) the set of variables in t, and we exploit
a predicate noKill( ), a slightly modified variant of that defined in Section 3, whose most
significant case is noKill(kill(k)) = false (this way, the predicate holds true if there are not
free kill activities that can be immediately performed). Notably, rules (constServ), (constServexp )
and (constServinv) differ from that shown in Table 7 for the addition of the predicate noKill(s)
to their premises. The presence of this predicate in the rules of Table 8 guarantees the eager
execution of unbounded kill activities. Indeed, for instance, the open term (kill(k) | n?v)
can only evolve as follows (rule (constServkill)):
true ⊢ (kill(k) | n?v) ≻ true , k−−−−−→ true ⊢ 0
We explain how the remaining rules work by means of some examples. By applying
rule (constServrec ), the term (n?x | n!x) can communicate with the environment (by receiving
an unknown value) and evolve as follows:
true ⊢ (n?x | n!x) ≻ x,bn , n⊲ x−−−−−−−−−→ x , bn ⊢ n!x
Notably, variable x is replaced by an unknown value, thus now the invoke activity can be
performed. By applying rule (constServsub ), the same term becomes closed:
true ⊢ (n?x | n!x) ≻ x,bn , x−−−−−−→ x , bn ⊢ (n?x | n!x)
23
Pugliese, Tiezzi and Yoshida
s
Φ′ , α
−−−−−→ s′ α = n ⊲ v , n ⊲ [x ] , n ∅ ℓ v
Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ)) noKill(s) (constServ)
Φ,∆ ⊢ s ≻
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ⊢ s′
s
Φ′ , n⊳ [n]
−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ n<∆
Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ)) noKill(s) (constServexp )
Φ,∆ ⊢ s ≻
Φ′′ , n⊳ [n]
−−−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ∪ {n} ⊢ s′
s
Φ′ , n⊳ v
−−−−−−−−→ s′ n<∆
Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ)) noKill(s) (constServinv)
Φ,∆ ⊢ s ≻
Φ′′ , n⊳ v
−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ⊢ s′
s
Φ′ , α
−−−−−→ s′ α = k , † Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ))
(constServkill)
Φ,∆ ⊢ s ≻
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ⊢ s′
x ∈ fv(s) Φ′ = B((Φ ∧ x , bn), s, uvar(Φ))
(constServsub )
Φ,∆ ⊢ s ≻
Φ′ , x
−−−−→ Φ′,∆ ⊢ s·{x 7→ x}
s
Φ′ ,n⊲ x
−−−−−−−−→ s′ noKill(s)
Φ′′ = B((Φ ∧Φ′ ∧ x , bn ∧ x , confRec(s, n)), s′, uvar(Φ)) (constServrec )
Φ,∆ ⊢ s ≻
Φ′′ ,n⊲ x
−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ⊢ s′ ·{x 7→ x}
s
Φ′ ,n {x 7→v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ Φ′′ = B((Φ ∧Φ′), s′, uvar(Φ)) noKill(s)
(constServcom)
Φ,∆ ⊢ s ≻
Φ′′ ,n {x 7→v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,∆ ⊢ s′ ·{x 7→ v}
Table 8
Symbolic semantics for COWS open terms
Now, both receive and invoke activities can communicate with the environment and also
internal communication can take place. Finally, if we slightly modify the term as (n?x |
n!v | s), by applying rule (constServcom), we obtain the following transition:
true ⊢ (n?x | n!v | s) ≻ true ,n {x 7→v} 1 v−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ true ⊢ s·{x 7→ v}
Also in this case the substitution for x is applied to the whole term.
5.2 Symbolic semantics for COWS with polyadic communication
We now tailor COWS syntax and symbolic semantics to deal with polyadic communication.
We first extend the syntax of invoke and receive activities as follows: u • u′!e¯ stands for an
invoke over the endpoint u • u′ with parameter the tuple of expressions e¯, while p • o?w.s
stands for a receive over the endpoint p • o with parameter the tuple of variables/(unknown)
values w and continuation s. Tuples can be constructed using a concatenation operator
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n?w.s
true ,n⊲w
−−−−−−−−−→ s (s-rec)
v( w ) = x¯ |x¯ | > 1
(s-reccom)
n?w.s
x,bn ,n⊲ [x¯ ] w
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s
s
Φ ,n⊲ [x¯ ] w
−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ y ∈ x¯
(s-delsub1)
[y] s Φ ,n⊲ [x¯ ] w−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ · {y 7→ y}
[[e1]] = (Φ1, v1 ) . . . [[en]] = (Φn, v n ) (s-inv)
n!〈e1 , . . . , en〉
Φ1 ∧ ...∧Φn ,n⊳ 〈v1 ,...,v n〉
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 0
s
Φ ,n⊳ v
−−−−−−−→ s′ n ∈ v n<n
(s-open1)
[n] s Φ ,n⊳ [n] v−−−−−−−−−→ s′
s
Φ ,n⊳ [m¯] v
−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ n ∈ v n<n
(s-open2)
[n] s Φ ,n⊳ [〈n〉:m¯] v−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
s1
Φ1 ,n⊲w
−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 s2
Φ2 ,n′⊳ v
−−−−−−−−−→ s′2 M( w, v ) = (Φ, σ) noConf(s1 | s2, n, v, |σ | ) = Φ′
(s-com)
s1 | s2
Φ1 ∧Φ2 ∧ n=n′ ∧Φ∧Φ′ ,nσ |σ | v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2
s
Φ ,nσ⊎{x7→v} ℓ v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(s-delsub2)
[x] s Φ ,nσℓ v−−−−−−−−→ s′ · {x 7→ v}
s1
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′1 α , k , n ⊲ [x¯ ] w , nσ ℓ v
(s-parpass)
s1 | s2
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
Φ ,nσℓ v
−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 noConf(s2, n, v, ℓ) = Φ′
(s-parcon f 1)
s1 | s2
Φ∧Φ′ ,nσℓ v
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
Φ ,n⊲ [x¯ ] w
−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 noConf(s2, n,w · {x¯ 7→ x}, |x¯ | ) = Φ′
(s-parcon f 2)
s1 | s2
Φ∧Φ′ ,n⊲ [x¯ ] w
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
Table 9
Operational semantics of COWS with polyadic communication (excerpt of rules)
defined as 〈a1, . . . , an〉 : 〈b1, . . . , bm〉 = 〈a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm〉. To single out an element
of a tuple, we will write (a¯, c, ¯b) to denote the tuple 〈a1, . . . , an, c, b1, . . . , bm〉, where a¯ or
¯b might not be present. We will use a¯i to denote the i-th element of the tuple a¯ and, when
convenient, we shall regard a tuple simply as a set writing e.g. a ∈ ¯b to mean that a is an
element of ¯b. Finally, we denote by v(t) the set of variables in t.
The labelled transition relation Φ , α−−−−−→ over services now is induced by the modified
rules shown in Table 9 (the remaining ones are those of Table 6, except for rule (s-match)
which we do not need anymore), where:
• conditions can also have the form Φ ∨ Φ′; we will use x , bn to denote condition
x1 , bn ∧ . . . ∧ x n , bn for x = 〈x1, . . . , x n〉;
• action labels are generated by the following grammar:
α ::= n ⊳ v | n ⊳ [n¯] v | n ⊲ w | n ⊲ [x¯] w | nσ ℓ v | k | †
All the above definitions shall extend to relation ≻ Φ , α−−−−→.
The new rules exploit a modified version of functions M( , ) and noConf( , , , )
defined in Tables 3 and 4, now redefined by the rules in Table 10. The rules in the upper
part of the table state that variables match any value, and two values v and v′ do match only
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M(x, v) = (true, {x 7→ v}) M(v, v′) = (v = v′, ∅) M(〈〉, 〈〉) = (true, ∅)
M(a1, b1) = (Φ1, σ1) M(a¯2, ¯b2) = (Φ2, σ2)
M((a1, a¯2), (b1, ¯b2)) = (Φ1 ∧ Φ2, σ1 ⊎ σ2)
noConf(s, n, v, ℓ) = ∧w∈ rec(s,n,v,ℓ)(∨(x ,i)∈gval( w ) x , v i ∧ ( gval( w ) = ∅ ⇒ false ) )
rec(n?w.s, n, v, ℓ) =

{w } if M( w, v ) = (Φ, σ) ∧ |σ| < ℓ
∅ otherwise
rec(0, n, v, ℓ) = rec(kill(k), n, v, ℓ) = rec(u!e¯,n, v, ℓ) = ∅ rec(n′?w.s,n, v, ℓ) = ∅ if n , n′
rec([d] s, n, v, ℓ) = rec(s, n, v, ℓ) if d < n rec([d] s, n, v, ℓ) = ∅ if d ∈ n
rec(g + g′, n, v, ℓ) = rec(g, n, v, ℓ) ∪ rec(g′,n, v, ℓ) rec({|s|}, n, v, ℓ) = rec(s, n, v, ℓ)
rec(s | s′,n, v, ℓ) = rec(s, n, v, ℓ) ∪ rec(s′, n, v, ℓ) rec(∗ s, n, v, ℓ) = rec(s, n, v, ℓ)
Table 10
Modified matching and conflicting receives rules
if condition v = v′ holds. When tuples w and v do match, M( w, v ) returns a pair (Φ, σ),
where Φ is the condition so that the matching holds, and σ is a substitution for the vari-
ables in w; otherwise, it is undefined. Function noConf(s, n, v, ℓ) now returns a condition
that guarantees absence of conflicts for the inferred transition. Basically, noConf(s, n, v, ℓ)
exploits function rec(s, n, v, ℓ) to identify the conflicting receives of s, then for each argu-
ments w of these receives it determines a condition (i.e. a logical disjunction of inequalities)
that makes the conflicting matching between w and v false. Finally, it returns the logical
conjunction of the determined conditions. We use the auxiliary function gval( ) that, given
a tuple w, returns a collection of pairs of the form (x, i), where x is an unknown value such
that w i = x. Notably, if rec(s, n, v, ℓ) = ∅ then function noConf(s, n, v, ℓ) returns the con-
dition true, because there are not conflicting receives; while, if there is a w ∈ rec(s, n, v, ℓ)
such that gval( w ) = ∅, then the function returns the condition false, because there are not
conditions that can make the conflicting matching false.
We end this section with an example aimed at clarifying how pattern-matching and
conflict checking functions work. Consider the following term:
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
In this case, the invoke activity n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 can synchronize with each receive activity of
the term. Firstly, consider the receive n?〈x, y, z〉: its argument 〈x, y, z〉 matches the tuple
〈v1, v2, v3〉 by generating the substitution {x 7→ v1, y 7→ v2, z 7→ v3}. The other two receive
activities are in conflict, because they satisfy the matching with the invoke and generate
substitutions with fewer pairs than 3. Thus, function rec( , , , ) applied to the whole
term 4 returns the set {〈x′, y′, z′〉, 〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉}. Then, function noConf( , , , ) returns the
4 This means that the last rule applied in the inference is (s-com). Of course, the last rule could be also (s-parcon f 1); in this
case, two or three conflict checks will be performed on subterms of the considered service.
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condition (y′ , v2 ∨ z′ , v3) ∧ z′′ , v3. Hence, a transition of the term is
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
(y′,v2 ∨ z′,v3)∧ z′′,v3 , n ∅ 3 〈v1 ,v2,v3〉
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
Consider now the receive n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉: in this case the matching function returns condi-
tion z′′ = v3 and substitution {x′′ 7→ v1, y′′ 7→ v2}. Function rec( , , , ) applied to the
whole term returns the set {〈x′, y′, z′〉}, because the only conflicting receive is n?〈x′, y′, z′〉.
Thus, the corresponding transition is
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
(y′,v2 ∨ z′,v3)∧ z′′=v3 , n ∅ 2 〈v1 ,v2,v3〉
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, v2, z′〉
Moreover, the receive activities can communicate with the environment; in this case the
conflict checks are performed by rule (s-parcon f 2). For example, the transition corresponding
to the execution of n?〈x, y, z〉 is
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
x,bn∧ y,bn∧ z,bn∧ (y′,y∨ z′,z)∧ z′′,z , n⊲ [〈x,y,z〉] 〈x,y,z〉
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
Finally, as another example consider the following term:
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, v2, v3〉
If we try to infer the transition corresponding to the communication with n?〈x, y, z〉, we
have that the condition on the transition label is false, because function rec( , , , ) returns
〈x′, v2, v3〉 and gval(〈x′, v2, v3〉) = ∅.
6 Related work and concluding remarks
Symbolic semantics and symbolic bisimulation were first introduced in [13] by Hennessy
and Lin on value-passing process algebras. The symbolic approach has been then applied to
π-calculus in [24] by Sangiorgi and in [4] by Boreale and De Nicola. Victor has adopted a
similar approach in [25] to efficiently characterise hyperequivalence for the fusion calculus.
A more recent work on a symbolic semantics for a fusion-based calculus is [6] by Buscemi
and Montanari. A revisited symbolic technique for π-calculus has been recently proposed
in [2] by Bonchi and Montanari.
COWS is a process calculus introduced in [16] for specifying and combining service-
oriented applications, while modelling their dynamic behaviour. Since its definition, a
number of methods and tools have been devised to analyse COWS specifications, such as a
type system to check confidentiality properties [17], a logic and a model checker to express
and check functional properties of services [11], a stochastic extension to enable quanti-
tative reasoning on service behaviours [22], a static analysis to establish properties of the
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flow of information between services [1], and bisimulation-based observational semantics
to check interchangeability of services and conformance against service specifications [23].
An overview of some of the above tools, with an application to the analysis of a case study,
can be found in [18].
We believe that the alternative symbolic operational semantics defined in this paper can
pave the way for the development of efficient model and equivalence checkers for COWS.
In fact, the model checking approach of [11] does not support a fully compositional veri-
fication methodology. It allows to analyse systems of services ‘as a whole’, but does not
enable analysis of services in isolation (e.g. a provider service without a proper client). The
symbolic operational semantics should permit to overcome this limitation that is somewhat
related to the original semantics of COWS which, although based on an LTS, follows a re-
duction style. Furthermore, the symbolic operational semantics can be used to improve ef-
ficiency of checking the equivalences introduced in [23]. This, of course, requires defining
alternative characterizations of the equivalences on top of the symbolic transition system.
We plan to pursue these lines of research in the near future, and in particular to implement
the operational semantics and equivalence and model checkers on top of it.
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